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JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE POLITICS OF
SCHOLARSHIP
Priscilla H. Machado*
Wallace Mendelson**
There are tides and fashions in scholarship. Not so long ago,
learned men taught that judicial review had been conceived in sin,
served mainly the rich, and was incompatible with democracy. The
prime proponents of these views-J. Allen Smith, Charles Beard,
and Brooks Adams-have now lost much of their following. Today
learned men-Charles Black, Eugene Rostow, and many othershave no qualms about the origins of the judicial veto, and consider
it a vital handmaiden of democracy. What used to be called "judicial supremacy," "the divine right of judges," "judicial oligarchy,"
and "the artistocracy of the robe" is now deemed harmonious with
(and in some quarters even a "legitimating" agent for) government
by the people.' No one suggests this dramatic change springs from
new primary source material or from fresh insights as to the meaning of democracy. Surely the catalyst was simply the rise of the
Warren Court.
There had been earlier episodes, but modern judicial activism
began in 1895. In that year the Supreme Court struck down the
federal income tax;2 severely restricted the Sherman Anti-trust
Act;J and legitimized the labor injunction.4 A year later it began an
energetic campaign against the Interstate Commerce Commission.s
Smyth v. Ames6 in 1898 blocked effective utility and railroad rate
regulation. Lochner v. New York 1 in 1905 incorporated laissez-faire
into the fourteenth amendment, and killed a maximum-ten-hour
workday for bakers.
Two years later J. Allen Smith responded with The Spirit of
•

**
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2.
3.
4.
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6.
7.

Lecturer, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 56-86 (1960).
Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 165 U.S. I (1895).
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197 (1896).
169 u.s. 466 (1898).
198 u.s. 45 (1905).
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American Government-a then radically new version of the origins
of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, he found, had not gone
wild, it was merely doing what it had been designed to do:
The Founding Fathers represented a reactionary movement against the idealism of
the Revolution. Fearful for their privileges as representatives of a ... "well-to-do"
class, they constructed a document with checks and balances exquisitely designed to
inhibit the popular will . . . . Diluting for the sake of expediency and appearance
the extreme centralized and undemocratic features of Hamilton's plan ... , the
framers had, however, achieved his ends .... s

Of the four organs of the new government, only the House of Representatives was to be directly elected by the people. The terms of
federal office were staggered (two, four, six years, and life). This
would make popular capture of the whole extremely difficult--each
of the three branches having "veto" or inhibiting powers vis-a-vis
the others. A minority-controlled amending process would make
improvements difficult. Finally, the crown jewel of the check-andbalance system: a judicial veto. In Smith's view it was so blatantly
anti-democratic that it could be included only implicitly-between
the lines, so to speak.9 In due time judicial spokesmen for Hamilton's "rich and the wellborn" would do what they were supposed to
do; namely, provide a barrier against what Smith deemed the "only
recognized source of legitimate authority," majority rule.
As though to supplement Smith's efforts, Charles Beard published The Supreme Court and the Constitution in 1912, and then
his bombshell, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States in 1913. The former was a response to "legal writers
of respectable authority" who since 1895 had been arguing that judicial review was an illegitimate power. Beard examined the words
and deeds of the framers of the Constitution, and as he later put it,
"laid the ghost of judicial usurpation."1o Then in An Economic Interpretation, having examined property holdings of the individual
framers, Beard offered empirical "proof" of Smith's thesis concerning the economic predilections of the Founding Fathers:
... not one [of them] represented in his immediate personal economic interests the
small farming or mechanic classes. [More than 80 percent of the Founders] were
immediately, directly and personally interested in the outcome of their labors at
Philadelphia, and were to a greater or less extent economic beneficiaries from the
adoption of the Constitution. II
8.
(1965).
9.

Stout, Introduction in J. SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GoVERNMENT xxxii

J. SMITH, supra note 8, at 108-109, 167.
10. See C. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (Macmillan ed. 1937).
I I. /d. at 150.
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Simultaneously Brooks Adams-scion of a famous family of
patriots-offered The Theory of Social Revolutions. Beginning with
Marbury, as he saw it, our courts had assumed sovereign powers
including "a supreme function which can only be compared to the
Dispensing Power claimed by the Stuarts, or the [ancient] authority
... in the Church to 'grant Indulgences for reasonable causes.' "
This power of granting immunity from the duty of obedience to
legislation made the judiciary a political body, Adams thought, ever
eager to reward its favorites, i.e. businessmen:
The capitalist ... regards the constitutional form of government ... in the United
States, as a convenient method of obtaining his own way against a majority, but the
lawyer has learned to worship it as a fetish. Nor is this astonishing, for, were written constitutions suppressed, he would lose most of his importance and much of his
income. Quite honestly, therefore, the American lawyer has come to believe that a
sheet of paper soiled with printers' ink and interpreted by half-a-dozen elderly
gentlemen ... has some inherent and marvelous virtue by which it can arrest the
march of omnipotent Nature.I2

The Smith-Beard-Adams outlook reverberated throughout the
academic world. Generations of students were trained in that tradition as old history and political science textbooks testify.B As recently as 1943 Henry Steel Commager-a giant in the liberal
tradition-repudiated judicial intrusion upon the political branches
of government. In Majority Rule and Minority Rights he wasted
few words on the usurpation issue: " ... atop all this [checking and
balancing] there developed-! would not say there was established-the practice of judicial review."I4 What was crucial for him
was a principle repeatedly expressed "from the beginning to the end
of Jefferson's career ... an unterrified and unflinching faith in majority rule.''I5 As Commager shows, Jefferson expresses that confidence over and over. To those who objected, Jefferson's response
was clear:
I.
2.

3.

12.

If the people are led astray, they "will soon correct themselves."
"(I]f we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control (adequately], ... the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education".
If the foundation of just power is not in the majority, "Will it be in the minority? Or in an individual of that minority?"

B. ADAMS, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS 214-15 (1913).
On the eve of Earl Warren's appointment to the bench a now famous political scientist, W. H. Riker, wrote for the benefit of undergraduates:
Judicial review was largely unanticipated. Its rationale reflects, therefore, experience, even historical accident, more than philosophy and constitutional plans ....
Marbury v. Madison (1804) was ... more a legal trick than a serious precedent.
W. RIKER, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 240-41 (1953).
14. H. COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 6 (1943).
15. /d. at 16.
13.
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If "man can not be trusted with the government of himself. ... [c)an he, then,
be trusted with the government of others?" 16

Commager concluded with Jefferson that "men need no mastersnot even judges." 11
Only seventeen years later Charles Black's The People and the
Court (1960) marked a watershed in liberal thinking-from Progressive and New Deal contempt for judicial activism to Warrenera glorification; from rejection, to acceptance, of major policymaking by judges. Black found "the preponderance of evidence" clearly
indicates the founders intended judicial review.1s Then, undercutting Smith, Beard, Adams, and Commager (to say nothing of Jefferson), he insisted it "fits harmoniously into the democratic
system."l9 This seminal effort by a gifted advocate-along with another by Eugene Rostow in 1962-provided the groundwork for an
outpouring of academic apologetics for Warrenism. Little if anything was added to the Black-Rostow rationale, but the magnitude
of the effort suggests "thou dost protest too much." For it is no
small matter to reconcile judicial paternalism with the bedrock
premise of democratic government; namely, that policymaking belongs to those who are politically accountable. The reconciliation
effort included suggestions that we need not be much concerned
with judges, for the rest of government is not so kosher either.2o
Let us accept, as did Smith and Beard, the view that the framers probably intended the judicial veto. But what of Black's view
that democracy and an activist judiciary are in harmony? His rationale was that: (1) "Congress and the President and the people
could, if they wanted to, dismantle the institution . . . . "; and
(2) "The premises of democracy are inarticulate and complex. But
one proposition that is not among them . . . is the proposition that
democracy requires that all decisions on policy be made by public
opinion from day to day, or even by those departments that are
most responsive to public opinion."21
We may concede Black's second proposition, noting that as an
argument in support of judicial activism, it entails a non sequitur.
His first proposition proves far too much. It equates toleration
(even helplessness) with acquiescence; it means the Czarist government of Russia and the Bourbon government of France were demo16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
3 Hous.
21.

/d. at 16-18.
/d. at 82.
C. BLACK, supra note I, at 23.
!d. at 178-82.
See response of McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion,
L. REV. 345 (1966).
C. BLACK, supra note I, at 178-79.
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cratic. More immediately to the point, it means the judicial
activism that prevailed in the four decades prior to 1937 was compatible with democracy.
Obviously most scholars in the Progressive-New Deal era
would have ridiculed Black's effort to justify the Court, just as they
had ridiculed analogous efforts by the American Liberty League. 22
Conversely, Smith and Beard fared badly in the Age of Warren.23
It would be incredible, if it were not true, that a scholar as capable
as Charles Black could write a book on democracy and judicial review without discussing the decades of Court abuse that began in
1895-abuse that Black's academic predecessors (including surely
his teachers) had roundly condemned. The fact is, one suggests,
judicial review as we experienced it from 1895 to 1937 was blatantly
in contempt of democracy. Our Blacks and Rostows simply do not
face that difficulty. Nor did they (in the 1960's) recognize the possibility of massive lawmaking by a future conservative (or reactionary) Court. Their efforts are date-bound, tracts for the Age of
Warren. They mistook benevolent oligarchy for democracy.
The Black-Rostow position now seems to have outlived its day,
at least in law-school circles. There a new generation of liberal
scholars is mining and sapping the foundations of Warrenism. The
attack is two-pronged. One finds classic expression in John Hart
Ely's Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980),
which incidentally is dedicated to Earl Warren. Inspired by Stone's
famous "footnote 4, "24 Ely rejects court excursions (negatively or
positively) into substantive policy. He would confine review to safeguarding the democratic processes (broadly conceived): "Policing
the Process of Representation," "Clearing the Channels of Political
Change," "Facilitating the Representation of Minorities."2s The
response to this "compromise" and to Jesse Choper's parallel effort,
Judicial Review and the National Political Process (1980), suggests a
more than passing interest in reform.
Still there are difficulties-exposed, for example, in Ely's treatment of the reapportionment cases.26 He approves them wholeheartedly for helping to clear the channels of political change. One
problem is that he starts with a questionable premise; namely, that
22.

See, e.g., Powell, Fifty-eight Lawyers Report, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. I I, 1935,

at 119-121.

23. See C. Strout, supra note 8, at xxxviii et seq.; R. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1956); F. McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE EcONOMIC ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1958).
24. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
25. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73, 105,
135 (1980).
26. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and companion cases.
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the beneficiaries of malapportionment "have a vested interest in
keeping things as they are," leaving the "victims" essentially helpless. Experience teaches a different lesson. The English got rid of
their rotten boroughs through the political process. That, too, is
how state after state repealed property qualifications on suffrage;
how state after state rejected religious qualifications on suffrage;
how state after state eliminated the poll tax (before the Court intervened); how women got the vote; how eighteen, nineteen, and
twenty year olds got the vote; and how we abolished the old system
of selecting United States Senators, and deprived the electoral college of its power to choose Presidents.
"We, the public," did not try much to kill malapportionment
presumably because we did not find it much of a problem-just as
we do not now consider gross malapportionment in the federal Senate much of a problem.21 A key ploy of the Warrenites-on and off
the bench-was a broad, unspoken (and unexamined) assumption
that, if voters and legislatures did not adopt forthwith a reform
deemed important by activists, there must be a flaw in the political
system. Ergo judicial intervention (including wholesale policymaking) was justified. It seems never to have occurred to Court and
campus activists that politics had not necessarily failed, but rather
that the community simply did not want the reform in question.2s
In any event by the end of the Warren era the Supreme Court had
reached its nadir of esteem in public opinion polls.29
Another hitch in Ely's effort is revealed in his view that the
malapportionment decisions merely freed the political process of an
27. Have we so soon forgotten that the purpose of the pre-Baker reapportionment
"drive" was to free urban America from "rural domination"? Malapportioned state legislatures, we were told, were responsible for the growing ills of city life. See G. BAKER, 4 RURAL
VERSUS URBAN POLITICAL POWER, 27-39 (1955); THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ONE
MAN-ONE VOTE (1962); Kennedy, The Shame of the States, New York Times Magazine,
May 18, 1958, at 12; Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1057, 1063 (I 958). Yet we have long since reapportioned without a hint of the promised renaissance of the cities. They still look more and more to the federal government for
help. The persistence of their difficulties despite one-person-one-vote suggests causes and
cures that have little to do with the apportionment of any legislative body. Unlike numerous
academicians, "We the people"-free of blinding ideology and the never-never-land DauerKelsay Index of Representativeness-seem to have been correct in discounting the alleged
rural sabotage of urban America. Incidentally the Dauer-Kelsay Index revealed that in 1962
the federal Senate was so malapportioned as to permit sixteen percent of the voters to elect a
majority of its members. In that pre-Reynolds year, only six state senates, and three state
houses of representatives were more severely "malapportioned." 17 CouNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, THE BooK OF THE STATES 66-67 (I 969).
28. For example, consider the abortion issue. A Gallup Newsweek Poll, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 14, 1985, at 22, indicates fifty-eight percent support for a ban on all abortions except in
the case of rape, incest, or when the mother's life is endangered. Only thirty-six percent
opposed such a ban.
29. See New York Times, Aug. 17, 1969, §I, at 42, col. I.
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impediment. But there is no unconstitutional "malapportionment"
without a standard for determining what apportionments are mal.
The Court simply selected and imposed upon us one of many theories of representation.Jo Ely approves. How easily in the name of
process-purification he slips into substantive lawmaking! The constitutional scheme for electing Presidents and Senators is utterly at
odds with the Court's "one-person-one-vote" theory. Those, then,
who gave us the Constitution could hardly have objected to "malapportionment." For, as the Warren Court recognized in the state
senate case,Jt no matter how pure the representation in the house,
the legislature will be impure, if the senate (a bottleneck) is impure.
As Justices Frankfurter and Harlan observed in dissent, one-personone vote
... was not the English system, it was not the colonial system, it was not the system
chosen for the national government by the Constitution, it was not the system exclusively or even predominantly practiced by the States at the time of adoption of
the fourteenth amendment, it is not predominantly practiced by the States today.32

The malapportionment decisions demonstrate the inadequacy
of the judicial process in the face of the complex problem at issue.
A catch-phrase (worthy of Madison Avenue) simply does not do the
job. As Mr. Justice Douglas observed in dissent: "The question of
the gerrymander is the other half of Reynolds v. Sims."33 One-person-one-vote alone means merely that all gerrymandered and other
voting districts in a given polity must be equal in population. This
hardly gives protection against watered-down votes. Yet neither
the Warren Court nor its successor has effectively challenged nonracial gerrymandering-apparently finding it beyond the capacity
of courts.34 The result is that today, though we have the comforting
30. If equal weight for all votes was the goal, proportional representation would have
been a better choice.
31. Lucas v. General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
32. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 301 (1962).
33. Whitcomb v. Chaviz, 403 U.S. 124, 176 (1971).
34. In Whitcomb, Mr. Justice Douglas observed in dissent:
It is said that if we prevent racial gerrymandering today, we must prevent gerrymandering of any special interest group tomorrow, whether it be social, economic,
or ideological. I do not agree. Our constitution has a special thrust when it comes
to voting; the Fifteenth Amendment says the right . . . to vote shall not be
"abridged" on account of "race" ....
/d. at 180.
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), promises little prospect for court involvement in non-racial gerrymandering. Post Script: Davis v. Brandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797
(1986), indicates that when unconstitutional vote dilution is alleged in the form of statewide
political gerrymandering the judiciary will not attempt to cure mere lack of proportional
representation, but may intervene when an electoral system is intended to, and does, consistently degrade a voter's influence on the political process as a whole.
One problem is that to district is to gerrymander in the sense that, however, it is done, it
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catch-phrase, we are far from controlling malapportionment. For
example, in the 1984 election Democrats "won" a fifty-eight percent
majority in the federal House of Representatives, though they received less than fifty-one percent of the total vote.Js Their minimal
victory at the polls gave them nearly a three-to-two lead in House
seats. Most of the reapportioning, as it happens, had been done by
Democratic state legislatures. Regardless of the reason, the fact remains: the minority party was underrepresented. The votes of its
supporters had been (to borrow from Earl Warren) "diluted."36
The second prong of the new, liberal reaction to Warrenism
relates to form rather than substance. It does not reject activism,
but rather make-believe in court opinions. There is no mystery in
the fact that no Justice has ever tried in public to justify activism.37
Wholesale lawmaking by judges is too utterly at odds with our longsettled understanding of the judicial function. Accordingly those
who "adjudicate" big changes into the law always pretend they are
not doing so. The Douglas opinion in Griswold Js and the Warren
opinions in Reynolds and Miranda are classic examples. What
Thomas Reed Powell said years ago of the old activists is equally
applicable to the new ones:
[They] seek to impress upon us in effect that it is not they who speak but the Constitution that speaketh in them . . . . It will ever remain a mystery to me how intelli-

will benefit some voters at the expense of others. One-person-one-vote might prevent diluted
votes, if all interests were uniform in strength and spread uniformly throughout the polity. In
the real world they are not thus homogenized. Some interest groups are large, some small;
some are geographically compact, some widespread, and some spotty; some have advantages
of prestige, some of organization, and some of dedication--others are correspondingly handicapped. The result is layered, crazy-quilt patterns of changing interests. Equal sized voting
districts imposed on such an uneven base are bound to produce uneven results, i.e., "diluted"
votes, or what might be called inadvertent gerrymandering. Consider, for example, a polity
divided into equal sized districts first by north-south boundary lines, and then alternatively by
east-west lines. Because of the uneven interest-base the former almost certainly would favor
one set of voters; the latter another. Yet both satisfy the Reynolds v. Sims test of size equality.
When Sims was decided in 1964 perhaps it could be argued that the requirement of
district size-equality would make gerrymandering difficult to achieve. The advent of districting by computer throughly undercut that proposition!
35. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 26, 1984 at 34, col I; Cf, Ornstein, Genesis of a
Gerrymander, id. May 7, 1985, at 30, col. 3. See also note 27, supra.
36. It is ironic that, though the Supreme Court has shown scant interest in gerrymanders, it has been a martinet with respect to numbers-equality in congressional districting.
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), struck down as excessive a seven-tenths of one
percent deviation.
37. Post Script: But see Justice Brennan's speech at Georgetown University on October
12, 1985 entitled "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification."
There, after a salute to "interpretivism," he goes far along the "non-interpretive" path. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § I, at I, col. I, and 36, col. 4 (excerpts).
38. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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gent jurists can make these professions of non participation in the judicial process. 39

Equally "perplexed," a new group of liberal critics calls-at
least by implication-for candor in Court opinions. 40 The classic
statement of this outlook is Thomas Grey's Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? (1975). A few years earlier a respected historian
had suggested in some detail that the Court's use of history to justify its results is often "illicit," simplistic, manipulative, and plainly
misleading. So many others reached similar conclusions that at the
end of the Warren regime a liberal, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian
observed (with documentation):
By now we all know the notorious fact: the Supreme Court has flunked history.
The justices stand censured for abusing historical evidence in a way that reflects
adversely on their intellectual rectitude ....41

In the interest of integrity (vis-a-vis the open-ended provisions of
the Constitution) Grey would abandon fairy-tale "interpretivism"
in favor of open, candid "non-interpretivism." This dichotomy is
now a major battle zone in legal literature. Its significance for present purposes is that it reveals a widespread disenchantment with
activist make-believe as, for example, in Griswold and Reynolds.
Our concern here is not who is right or wrong, but rather: how
can outstanding scholars derive such changing and conflicting conclusions from the same data? The question is perhaps naive. Still
let Charles Black-panegyrist of Warrenism-suggests an answer,
if only by implication. Deeply wounded by the Burger Court's "reinstatement" of the death penalty, he wonders lately "whether we
liberals ... may not be in part to blame for a ... quite evident trend
toward the point of view that reason doesn't matter much, and can
be brushed aside, if only the result is thought desirable . . . . What if
all this is turned on us? . . . Have we not ... asked for it?"42
Earlier Edward S. Corwin-perhaps the leading political scien39. T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 28
(1956).
40. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is of course the classic case of early,
laissez-faire judicial activism. In it the Court's innocence and candor are refreshing: "There
is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate
as a health law .... " /d. at 58. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is Lochner's
modern counterpart. Note there the Court's painful effort to find a privacy right to copulate
with contraceptives implicit in "penumbras formed by emanations" from our eighteenth-century Bill of Rights allegedly made applicable to Connecticut by a fair-trial provision in a
Civil-War-Reconstruction amendment. /d. at 480-86.
41. Levy, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial History, 84 POL.
SCI. Q. I (1969).
42. "The Judicial Power as Guardian of Liberties" in a symposium on The Supreme
Court and Constitutional Liberties in Modern America, Wayne State University, Detroit,
Michigan, October 16, 1976. (quoted in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, 346, 350
(1977)).
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tist of his day-had a similar change of heart. In 1914 he had concluded (as had Beard in 1912) that the framers clearly intended a
judicial veto over Congress: " . . . it cannot be reasonably
doubted."43 But when longstanding liberal opposition to the Court
produced the "Court fight" crisis of 1937, Corwin said, "The people
who say the framers intended it are talking nonsense [as are those
who claim the opposite.]"44 So too, but conversely, Commager had
second thoughts. In the heyday of Warrenism, twenty-three years
after his Majority Rule and Minority Rights, he returned to the
problem of judicial review in a democracy, he tells us, "with . . . a
somewhat livelier concern for its complexities."4s The Court had
become "liberal"!
The contradictory conclusions and vacillations of leading
scholars suggest a large measure of "statesmanship" in their efforts.
Their twistings and turnings are directly related to the shift of the
Court from very "conservative" to very "liberal," and now back
again to "conservatism" (with a threat of more to come). Ely,
Choper, and the new Black may be straws in an academic wind
blowing away from activism on the bench. That wind may become
a gale, if President Reagan has his way with the Court. If liberals
should now embrace judicial restraint, that would be merely a return to their stance throughout American history-save the brief
Warren-inspired lapse. It would spare us their make-believe of pretended "interpretivism." It would spare us the embarrassment of
tract-for-the-moment scholarship a Ia Smith, Beard, Black and Rostow. It would spare us the timely reconsiderations of our Corwins,
Commagers, and Charles Blacks. We would not have to pretend
that activism is democratic when it promotes liberal values (e.g.,
Griswold privacy), yet antidemocratic when it promotes conservative values (e.g., Lochner privacy).46

43. E. CORWIN, THE DocTRINE OF JuDICIAL REVIEW 10 (1914).
44. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Committee
on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2 (1937) (statement of EdwardS. Corwin).
45. H. COMMAGER, FREEDOM AND ORDER: A CoMMENTARY ON THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL ScENE vii (1966).
46. The Court's rationalization in either of these cases will support the result in the
other. Some may find in Griswold a less than candid approach that would support judicial
veto, or judicial "enactment," of virtually any legislative policy. For example, it "legitimates" (Charles Black's term) Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), wherein, we are told, the
Constitution divides the period of human gestation into trimesters and prescribes in some
detail the varying scope of "privacy" appropriate to each.

